

## **Left Behind By Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability**

*"We were told to cross off the kids who would never pass. We were told to cross off the kids who, if we handed them the test tomorrow, they would pass. And then the kids who were left over, those were the kids we were supposed to focus on."\**

By Derek Neal  
University of Chicago and NBER

Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach  
University of Chicago

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\*Quote from an anonymous middle school staff member in "Rockville School's Efforts Raise Questions of Test-Prep Ethics" by Daniel de Vise, *Washington Post*, March 4, 2007

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## **ABSTRACT**

Many test-based accountability systems, including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), place great weight on the numbers of students who score at or above specified proficiency levels in various subjects. Accountability systems based on these metrics often provide incentives for teachers and principals to target children near current proficiency levels for extra attention, but these same systems provide weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are clearly proficient already or who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near term.

We show based on fifth grade test scores from the Chicago Public Schools that both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution. Nonetheless, the least academically advantaged students in Chicago did not score higher in math or reading following the introduction of accountability, and we find only mixed evidence of score gains among the most advantaged students. A large existing literature argues that accountability systems built around standardized tests greatly affect the amount of time that teachers devote to different topics. Our results for fifth graders in Chicago, as well as related results for sixth graders after the 1996 reform, suggest that the choice of the proficiency standard in such accountability systems determines the amount of time that teachers devote to students of different ability levels.

For more than a decade, test-based accountability systems have been a key element of many education reform proposals at the state and district levels, and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 created a federal mandate for test-based accountability in every state. A key feature of NCLB is the requirement that each state adopt an accountability system built, in large part, on standardized testing in reading and math for students in grades three through eight. The law seeks to hold schools accountable for student performance by mandating that schools make the results of these standardized assessments available to parents and that schools report not only aggregate results but also results specific to particular demographic groups, e.g. groups defined by race or special education status. These reports must convey the fractions of students in particular schools and demographic groups within schools who have achieved proficiency in a particular subject for their grade level. NCLB spells out a set of sanctions that schools should expect to face if they persistently report proficiency levels below the targets set by their state for each calendar year.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper, we use data from the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) to examine how a specific aspect of the implementation of NCLB affects the distribution of measured changes in achievement among students. The implementation of NCLB in most states and the design of many state and local accountability systems tie rewards and sanctions to the number of students in certain groups scoring above given proficiency thresholds. We use the introduction of two separate accountability systems in CPS, a district-wide system implemented in 1996 and the introduction of NCLB in 2002, to investigate the impacts of proficiency-count accountability systems on the distribution of student performance.

In all our analyses, we focus on test score outcomes among students in a given grade. We compare students who took a specific high stakes exam under a new accountability system with students who took the same exam under low stakes in the year before the accountability system was implemented. Further, because we restrict our comparisons to students who took exams either right before or right after the implementation of an accountability system, we can make these comparisons holding constant student performance on a similar low-stakes exam in an earlier grade. Thus, we are able to measure changes in test scores associated with the accountability system at different points in the distribution of prior achievement.

Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) warn that, when workers perform complex jobs involving many tasks, pay for performance schemes based on objective measures of output often create incentives for workers to shift effort among the various tasks they perform in ways that improve their own performance rating but hinder the overall mission of the organization. Holmstrom and Milgrom cite "teaching to the test" in response to test-based accountability systems as an obvious example of this phenomenon, and much of the existing empirical literature on test-based accountability focuses on whether or not the introduction of such systems generates actual increases in subject

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.html>

mastery or simply increases in test-taking skills that are specific to a certain assessment.<sup>2</sup> This issue is important for the current policy debate concerning accountability systems, but it will not be our focus.

We are not concerned with how the details of NCLB assessments and associated testing procedures shape what teachers teach. We are interested in whom teachers teach. We show how the use of proficiency counts as performance measures provides strong incentives for schools to focus on students who are near the proficiency standard. However, because proficiency count systems do not reward schools for improving student performance unless the improvements bring the students up to a specific proficiency standard, schools face weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are either already proficient or who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near term. Teachers must allocate their time among many tasks, and our analysis illustrates that details concerning the design of performance measures used in accountability systems matter not only for how teachers allocate class time to different topics but also how they allocate their attention to different students.

Lazear (2006) notes that, on a different dimension, NCLB is designed to help those who may struggle most to become proficient. He shows that accountability systems built around assessments that are tied to a narrow set of curriculum related questions may generate a greater effort response among those who find learning difficult than systems based on more broad assessments of general subject mastery. Lazear argues that students who find learning difficult, and their teachers, may not respond to the accountability system if the preparation for the assessment requires mastery of too many topics or familiarity with too many types of questions. The results we derive are in no way in conflict with Lazear's. Lazear is arguing that as one makes NCLB assessments more broad in scope, one should worry that some students and their teachers will simply decide that the cost of trying to become proficient is too great. We are arguing that, even if states adopt relatively straightforward assessments, teachers may decide that the cost of helping their lowest performing students exceeds their expected benefit because NCLB only rewards proficiency and not progress toward proficiency.

We provide results that characterize the distribution of test score changes among fifth graders in Chicago following the introduction of NCLB in 2002, and we present similar results for fifth graders tested in Chicago in 1998 following the introduction of a school accountability system that was similar to NCLB on many dimensions. The results for both sets of fifth graders follow a strikingly consistent pattern. Students at the bottom of the distribution of measured third grade achievement score the same as or lower following these reforms than one would have expected given the pre-reform relationships between third and fifth grade scores, but students in the middle of the distribution score

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<sup>2</sup> See Carnoy and Loeb (2002), Grissmer and Flanagan (1998), Hanushek and Raymond (2004), Jacob (2005), and Koretz (2002). These studies are motivated by the concern that "teaching to the test" may artificially inflate scores. See Cullen and Reback (2006) for an assessment of strategic efforts among Texas schools to improve reported scores by manipulating which students are exempt from testing.

significantly higher than expected. Further, there is, at best, mixed evidence of gains among students in the top decile.

We also present results for sixth graders tested in 1998. These students were affected directly by both the school level accountability system instituted within CPS and a separate set of test score cutoffs used to determine summer school placement and retention decisions. Chicago's effort to end social promotion linked summer school attendance and retention decisions to score cutoffs that were much lower than the proficiency cutoffs used to determine school level performance. Thus, sixth graders who had little chance of contributing to their school's overall proficiency rating did face strong incentives to work harder in school. The results for these sixth graders follow the same general pattern observed in the fifth grade results. However, the estimated gains among sixth graders tend to be larger at each decile, and our estimated treatment effects for the least able sixth graders are never negative.<sup>3</sup>

We conclude that NCLB provides relatively weak incentives to devote extra attention to either students who have no realistic chance of becoming proficient in the near term or students who are already proficient. Proponents of NCLB may counter that NCLB mitigates any incentives to ignore less able students by requiring a 100% proficiency rate in all schools by 2013-14. However, it is not clear that this provision of the law constitutes a credible threat,<sup>4</sup> and even if one assumes that principals and teachers take the 100% target seriously, this feature of the law should make things worse for the current cohort of elementary school students who are far below grade level in math and reading. Schools must realize that many of their current students will be "off the books" long before their state plans require them to be near 100% proficient. Thus, NCLB provides little incentive for an elementary school to devote extra attention to a fifth grader who is currently reading at a second grade level and will be attending a nearby middle school next year.

The distributional consequences of the Illinois implementation of NCLB are complex. Hanushek and Raymond (2004) argue based on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) data and differences over time and among states in the stakes associated with state-level accountability systems that test-based accountability reduces racial achievement gaps, and our results are not inconsistent with this conclusion. The Chicago Public Schools contain relatively few white students, and average test scores did increase following both NCLB and the CPS reforms of 1996. Thus, although we do not have comparable data from other school districts in Illinois, our results certainly admit the possibility that NCLB narrowed the achievement gaps between whites and minorities in Illinois. However, the group of students within CPS who were likely

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<sup>3</sup> We present eighth grade results in an appendix, but as we explain below, the 1996 eighth grade exam may not be an entirely clean measure of pre-reform performance.

<sup>4</sup> NCLB contains a reauthorization requirement for 2007. Thus, goals that push the limits of credulity and are not required by NCLB until 2014 may play a small role in shaping teachers' and principals' expectations concerning how the law will be enforced.

not helped and may have been harmed by NCLB is sizeable and predominately Black and Hispanic.

Several studies on the use of proficiency counts in accountability systems other than NCLB provide results that are consistent with ours. Reback (2007) uses data from Texas during the 1990s to measure how schools allocated effort in response to a state-wide accountability system. He finds that achievement gains are larger among students whose gains are likely to make the greatest marginal contribution to their school's overall proficiency rating. Burgess et al. (2005) use English data to show that achievement gains are lower among less able students if they attend schools in which a large fraction of the student body are marginal students with respect to an important score threshold in the English accountability system. On the other hand, Springer (2007) analyzes data from the testing program that Idaho instituted following the introduction of NCLB schools and argues that he does not see evidence that the use of proficiency counts in NCLB led to increased teacher effort among only one particular group of students.

All of these papers differ from ours methodologically because none of the authors have access to data on achievement growth prior to the introduction of accountability. The Reback (2007) and Burgess et al (2005) studies create comparisons among students who may receive differential treatment because of interaction effects between the composition of their peers and the proficiency rules of a particular accountability system. Springer's interpretation of his results rests on the implicit assumption that, in the absence of NCLB, expected gains in individual test scores between fall and spring of a given school year would be the same at all levels of fall achievement. We do not have to make these types of identifying assumptions because we can estimate the relationship between current levels of achievement and expected scores in future grades using data collected under low-stakes testing. We have test score data on all Chicago students starting in the early 1990s, and both the tests used for NCLB purposes in Illinois as well as the tests used for the district's accountability program in the late 1990s were administered in years prior to the introduction of these accountability systems. Ours is the only study in this literature with access to control groups who took the assessments used in accountability systems as low-stakes exams prior to the introduction of accountability.<sup>5</sup>

Several studies of particular schools also find results consistent with those we present below. Gillborn and Youdell (2000) coined the term "educational triage" to describe their findings from case studies of English schools. They document how these schools targeted specific groups of students for special instruction in order to maximize the number of students who performed above certain thresholds in the English system. More recently, Booher-Jennings (2005) and White and Rosenbaum (2007) present evidence from case studies of two schools serving economically disadvantaged students in Texas and Chicago respectively. White and Rosenbaum document the actions of

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<sup>5</sup> Both the Idaho and Texas data provide no information about how various schools performed in the absence of NCLB. Springer notes that his results may reflect "customary school behavior irrespective of NCLB's threat of sanctions..."

teachers and administrators in response to the introduction of the 1996 district level accountability system in Chicago, a system we describe in detail below. Booher-Jennings documents how the staff of a school in Texas responded to the state's accountability system. Both provide clear evidence that teachers and administrators made conscious and deliberate decisions to shift resources away from low performing students and toward students who had more realistic chances of exceeding key threshold scores. For example, White and Rosenbaum describe how the Chicago school in question targeted students near important threshold scores during the implementation of a new after-school program, and Booher-Jennings describes how the teachers in the Texas school used data on prior achievement to focus their efforts on the group of students for whom the state proficiency standard seemed attainable given moderate amounts of extra instruction.

The most striking description of the type of behavior our model predicts appears in a recent Washington Post article concerning the directions given by a middle school principal in Rockville, Maryland to her staff as she handed out student rosters and explained a plan for achieving AYP. One staffer described the plan in the following terms:

*"We were told to cross off the kids who would never pass. We were told to cross off the kids who, if we handed them the test tomorrow, they would pass. And then the kids who were left over, those were the kids we were supposed to focus on."*<sup>6</sup>

In the next section, we present a model of teacher effort within schools. Then, we turn to the details of the 1996 and 2002 reforms and their implementation in Chicago before turning to our empirical results. After presenting our results, we discuss the challenges that policy makers face if they wish to replace NCLB's reliance on proficiency counts with a system of measuring progress that will value the achievement gains of all students. Currently, a number of states have been granted waivers that allow them to calculate AYP using more continuous measures of student performance than simple proficiency counts. We analyze the likely effects of these alternative schemes using variants of the same model of teacher effort that we describe in the next section. Our model clearly illustrates that these waivers make it easier to design accountability systems that do not build in direct incentives to leave some children behind, but we argue that tough design issues remain unresolved. In our conclusion, we discuss the extent to which our results from Chicago speak to the likely effects of NCLB in other large cities.

## **1) Keeping Score Using Proficiency Counts**

Consider a school that is part of a test-based accountability system. Two policies shape the actions of teachers and principals. To begin, the central administration, in cooperation with parents, provides enough monitoring to make sure the school provides

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<sup>6</sup> See "Rockville School's Efforts Raise Questions of Test-Prep Ethics" by Daniel de Vise, March 4, 2007.

some baseline level of instruction to all students. Because our empirical work measures changes in performance that follow the introduction of accountability within groups of students who are similar with respect to prior achievement levels, it is not essential for our purposes that baseline instruction be identical for all students, but this assumption does allow us to easily describe both our model and our empirical results in terms of the changes induced by accountability systems. We do not address the socially optimal amount of effort per teacher or the socially optimal allocation of effort among students. We take as given for now that teachers and the principal enjoy rents given their pay and the baseline allocation of effort per student. Thus, we view the introduction of test-based accountability as an attempt to extract more effort from teachers, and we examine how this attempt to increase overall teacher effort also changes the distribution of teacher effort among students of different abilities.

Given the monitoring system that guarantees baseline effort, also consider a testing system that labels each student as either passing or failing. Further, assume that the principal and teachers incur costs that are a function of the number of their students who fail. These costs may take many forms depending on the details of the accountability system.<sup>7</sup> The key point is that NCLB keeps score, and the earlier Chicago accountability system kept score, based on the number of students whose test scores exceed certain thresholds. Thus, we model our hypothetical accountability system as a penalty function that imposes costs on teachers and principals when students do not reach a proficiency standard, and we assume that these costs are strictly convex in the number of students who fail.<sup>8</sup>

Our school can improve individual test scores by providing extra instruction at a constant cost of  $c$  per student who receives a unit of extra help. Here, extra instruction reflects efforts by principals and teachers that go beyond the minimum effort level that the district can enforce through its monitoring technology. We ignore any agency problem between principals and teachers and model the school as a unitary decision making unit.

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<sup>7</sup> Under NCLB, schools must report publicly how many of their students are proficient, and they face serious sanctions if their proficiency rates remain below statewide targets. In Chicago, the district adopted a system in 1996 that measured school level performance based on the number of students exceeding national norms on specific exams. In addition, Chicago schools and students faced additional pressures related to a separate set of lower thresholds (on the same tests) that determined whether or not students in grades 3, 6, and 8 were required to attend summer school and possibly repeat their grade.

<sup>8</sup> NCLB also includes provisions concerning the fraction of students who are proficient within certain demographic groups defined by race, family income, and disability status. Incorporating these subgroup provisions in our model would complicate our analyses but not change our results. The high cost of bringing low-achieving students up to proficiency would still imply that some schools could optimally allocate no extra instruction to their low-achieving students. Further, these provisions are less important for NCLB implementation in Chicago than many other school districts because schools in Chicago are highly segregated by race and income.

Because the baseline level of instruction for all students is not a choice variable for the school, the school's problem is to minimize the total cost incurred by the allocation of extra instruction among its students and the penalties associated with student failures. Suppose that there are  $N$  students in a school and each student has ability

$$\alpha_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, N.$$

Further, assume that for any individual  $i$ , her score on the accountability test is

$$t_i = e_i + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$e_i$  = extra instruction received by student  $i$

$\varepsilon_i$  = measurement error on  $i$ 's test drawn from  $F(\varepsilon)$ , which has a unimodal, symmetric density  $f(\varepsilon)$ .

The cutoff score for passing is  $\bar{t}$ . We assume that  $N$  is large, and we approximate the school's objective function by treating the expected number of students who fail in each school as the actual number of failures in each school. Thus, the school's problem is as follows:

$$(1) \quad \min_{e_i} \Psi \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N F(\bar{t} - e_i - \alpha_i) \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N c e_i \quad \text{s.t. } e_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$

Here,  $\Psi[\cdot]$  is a penalty function that describes the sanctions suffered by a school of size  $N$  under the accountability system. This penalty function is strictly increasing and convex in the number of students who are not proficient. The first order conditions that define optimal effort require

$$\Psi'[\cdot] f(\bar{t} - e_i^* - \alpha_i) \leq c \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$

It is easy to generate examples such that schools devote no extra effort to students at or below some critical ability level, and it is equally easy to generate examples such that schools devote no extra effort to students above some critical ability level. However, Appendix B demonstrates that solutions do not exist that involve a school allocating no extra effort to a given student but applying positive extra effort to other students who are both more and less able. If the solution to the school's problem involves positive extra effort for some students and no extra effort for others, the students who receive no extra attention will not be restricted to the center of the distribution of ability.

In a school with a sufficiently diverse student population, the optimal allocation of effort among students follows the pattern presented in Figure 1. There are students at

both the top and bottom of the distribution who receive no extra instruction at all, and among students who receive extra instruction, the school directs the most attention to the least able and the least attention to the most able. Two stark aspects of Figure 1 deserve attention. To begin, the negative, linear relationship between student ability and teacher effort among those who receive positive effort is not a general result. If we assume that the effort cost of raising a student's expected score by a given amount  $\tau$  is convex in  $\tau$ , teachers will still concentrate their effort among students in the interior of the ability distribution, but the effort applied to these students need not decline monotonically and certainly not linearly with ability. Another striking feature of Figure 1 is the sharp jump in extra instruction between the most able student receiving no extra help and the least able student receiving extra help. The first order condition above illustrates the logic behind this result. The marginal benefit from investing in students is determined by the height of  $f(\cdot)$  at different points, and since  $f(\cdot)$  is unimodal, small investments in either extremely high or low ability students may fail to generate reductions in the probability of failure that cover the cost of effort. However, because  $f(\cdot)$  is unimodal, the marginal return from investment in low-ability students is at first increasing and then decreasing in total investment, and among students with ability just greater than or equal to,  $\alpha_{low}$ , a large intervention does generate a reduction in the probability of failure that is worth more than the total effort cost of the intervention. Small investments in students who are far below the proficiency standard are never optimal because they generate relatively trivial changes in the probability of failure, and often, it is optimal to simply ignore these students. Nonetheless, among the more able of the least able, large interventions may be worthwhile.

Although it makes perfect sense that teachers will not target small amounts of effort toward students who would still need miraculous draws from the measurement error distribution,  $F(\cdot)$ , in order to score above  $\bar{t}$ , we do not expect our empirical estimates of the changes in achievement associated with the introduction of accountability to exhibit the sharp jump present in Figure 1. To begin, our empirical work places students in ability groups based on our estimates of their ability. Even if we began with a data set created by simulating our model, it is clear that the aggregation of ability types into groups as well as any classification errors that arise while placing students into ability groups can generate a relationship between average test score improvements among groups<sup>9</sup> and average ability within these groups that exhibits a gradual increase in achievement gains as one moves from the least able groups to those in the middle of the distribution. Further, in our model we have ignored group instruction or any spillovers among students. We include no mechanism by which teacher efforts to prepare one group of students can generate residual benefits for other students. This feature of our model is not crucial for our main result concerning the concentration of

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<sup>9</sup> Note that, in our model, the expected value of the average test score gain in a group is simply the average value of effort allocated to the students in the group.

teacher effort among students near the proficiency standard, but it does generate the sharp jump in optimal effort observed at  $\alpha_{low}$ .<sup>10</sup>

Having explored these issues, we also want to stress that the exact shape of Figure 1 is not our main concern. The key implication of our model and the focus of our empirical work is that accountability systems built around proficiency counts may provide strong incentives for schools to provide extra help to students in the middle of the ability distribution while providing few incentives for these schools to direct extra attention to students who are either far below proficiency or already proficient. We think that the absence of direct incentives to help those students who are achieving at the lowest levels is especially noteworthy because this feature of the NCLB design is at odds with the stated goals of the legislation, and the implication that the least able may be left behind by design is a quite robust feature of our model. Although we have assumed that the marginal product of instruction is independent of student ability, we could make the more common assumption that ability and instruction are complements in the production of knowledge. In this scenario, the relative cost of raising scores among less able students increases, and it remains straightforward to construct scenarios in which students below a given ability level receive no extra attention even though more able students do benefit from the accountability system.

It is worth noting that under this type of accountability system, the choice of  $\bar{t}$  determines the distribution of achievement gains. Consider an increase in the standard for proficiency  $\bar{t}$ . It is easy to show that this increase in the standard can only decrease and never increase the number of high ability students that receive no extra instruction. Thus, higher standards can only benefit and never harm the most able students. However, a higher standard may actually increase the number of low ability students that a given school ignores by increasing the number that have little or no chance of being proficient in the near term.<sup>11</sup> NCLB became law surrounded by political rhetoric that championed the need to end the “soft bigotry of low expectations” for disadvantaged children. It is thus ironic that “high expectations” expressed in the form of high NCLB proficiency standards may actually be detrimental to disadvantaged children.

Also note that one can easily construct a more general model that imbeds our analyses of effort allocation within schools as one component in a model of the labor market for teachers and principals. Here, differences among schools in the indirect utilities associated with the solutions to the effort allocation problems faced by various schools will drive the sorting of teachers and principals among schools. Assuming the function  $\Psi(\cdot)$  is the same for all schools of the same size, schools with more able

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<sup>10</sup> Teachers may also be uncertain concerning the capacities that their students possess. Nonetheless, teachers will still not invest in a student if their assessment of the student's current achievement level implies that the expected returns from doing so are negative.

<sup>11</sup> A higher standard does not necessarily generate this result. A higher standard also raises the baseline failure rate and, because the penalty function is convex, raises the gain associated with moving any single student up to the proficiency standard.

students provide a superior working environment for principals and teachers because academically disadvantaged students raise the cost of meeting any specific passing rate given a common proficiency standard. If the distribution of initial student ability is worse in school A than school B, teachers and principals in school A must work harder than those in school B to achieve the same standing under the accountability system, and this should adversely effect the relative supply of teachers who want to teach in school A.

Clotfelter et al. (2004) examine changes in teacher retention rates in North Carolina following the introduction of a state-wide accountability system in 1996. The North Carolina system clearly raised the relative cost of teaching in schools with large populations of disadvantaged students, and the authors document that this system was associated with significant declines in retention rates among schools with many students who had low achievement levels prior to the introduction of accountability. Clotfelter et al. (2004) find mixed evidence concerning the quality of teachers who left these schools following the introduction of accountability, but their results are difficult to square with the hypothesis that the additional departures from these schools were driven primarily by an increase in the departure of incompetent teachers.

A child's test score in third grade reflects not only the quality of their instruction in school but also the gifts and abilities they have developed at home. Some children arrive at first grade knowing how to read at a second or third grade level, and others do not know the letters of the alphabet. When all children are held to the same proficiency standard, teachers are necessarily being held to different standards, and an accountability system that tells reading teachers they will be judged simply by whether or not their students read at grade level by third grade will likely make it even more difficult for schools in disadvantaged communities to hire good teachers and even easier for schools in affluent areas to find quality applicants.

## **2) High Stakes Testing In Chicago**

We use data in the years surrounding the introduction of two separate accountability systems in CPS. The first, implemented in 1996, linked school-level probation status to the number of students who achieved a given level of proficiency in reading on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS). It also linked grade retention decisions concerning individual students in "promotion gate" grades to the achievement of specific proficiency levels in reading and math. The second system is the 2002 implementation of NCLB testing in Illinois, which initially covered student performance in grades 3, 5 and 8 on the Illinois State Achievement Test (ISAT).

During 1996, a new administration within the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) introduced a number of reforms, and these reforms attached serious consequences to standardized test results.<sup>12</sup> In the fall of 1996, CPS introduced a school accountability system. Among elementary schools, probation status was determined primarily by the

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<sup>12</sup> See Bryk (2003) and Jacob (2003) for more on the history of recent reform efforts in CPS.

number of students who earned reading scores equal to or greater than the national norm for their grade. Schools on probation were forced to create and implement school improvement plans, and these schools knew that they faced the threat of reconstitution if their students' scores did not improve. Although math scores were not a major factor in determining probation status, schools also faced pressure to improve math scores. As part of the reform efforts, CPS chose to publicly report proficiency rates in math and reading at the school level. Principals and teachers knew that the reading and math performance of their students would be reported in local newspapers, and these school report cards measured school performance using the number of students who performed at or above national norms in reading or math. With regard to sanctions and public reports, proficiency counts were the key metric of school performance in the CPS system.

In addition, there were other score thresholds in reading and math that played a large role in the reform. In March 1996, before the school accountability system was introduced, CPS announced a plan to end social promotion. The new elementary school promotion policy required students in third, sixth, and eighth grades to score above specific thresholds in math and reading or attend summer school. These cutoff scores were far below the national norms that CPS would later use to calculate proficiency rates for schools, but they were clearly relevant hurdles for students in the bottom half of the CPS achievement distribution. Even the median student likely faced more than a twenty percent risk of summer school if she exerted no extra effort. Students who attended summer school were tested again at the end of summer and retained if they still had not reached the target score levels for their grade.

This policy was announced in late March of 1996. CPS exempted third and sixth grade students from the policy until spring of 1997, but the new policy did link eighth grade summer school and retention decisions to the 1996 spring tests results. Since the promotion policy was announced only weeks before testing began, we believe that the eighth grade exams in the spring of 1996 do not reflect many of the impacts of the reform, but we also do not believe that these exams were completely unaffected by the March announcement. For completeness, we present results for eighth graders in two appendix figures. The patterns in these figures are quite similar to those for sixth graders and are consistent with the hypothesis that the March announcement had small effects on the eighth grade exam, but we focus our discussion of the joint effects of the school accountability and retention policies on the sixth grade results because we are able to make a more credible designation of treatment and control cohorts among sixth graders.

The retention policies in the CPS reforms are interesting from our perspective because CPS also built these policies around cutoff scores and because retentions forced students and their families to deal with a summer school program that they did not choose. Thus, retentions represented a source of potential frustration for parents and another source of performance pressure linked to proficiency counts. Further, the lower cutoff scores for summer school put many students at risk of summer school while still giving almost all students a real chance to avoid it. This was not the case with regard to the proficiency levels used to determine school level performance under the 1996 reforms, and it was not the case with regard to the ISAT proficiency cutoffs under NCLB

in 2002. Thus, the results for sixth grade students allow us to see what the distribution of achievement gains looks like when more students have a realistic chance of meeting an important threshold score.

The 1996 CPS reforms adopted the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) as the primary performance assessment in reading and math. Different forms of the test were given in different years, but in our analyses of ITBS data, we concentrate only on years when Form L was given. These years, 1994, 1996, and 1998, are the only years surrounding the 1996 reform that permit a comparison of pre-reform and post-reform cohorts using a common form of the ITBS. Our analyses seek to measure changes in scores relative to pre-reform baselines at different points in the distribution of prior achievement. If we use years other than the Form L years, our results will reflect not only any real differences in the effects of the reform at various ability levels but also any differences among ability levels in the accuracy of the psychometric methods used to place scores from different forms on a common scale. While it is not easy to equate scores among forms in a manner that is correct on average, the task of equating scores in a manner that is accurate at each point in the distribution of ability is even more demanding.

In the 1998-99 school year, the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) introduced a new exam to measure performance of students relative to the state learning standards and administered the test statewide, but only in grades 3, 5 and 8. For many reasons, CPS viewed the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) as a collection of relatively low stakes exams during the springs of 1999, 2000, and 2001.<sup>13</sup> However, in the fall of 2001 with the passage of NCLB looming on the horizon, the ISBE placed hundreds of schools in Illinois on a watch list based on their 1999 through 2001 scores on ISAT and also declared that the 2002 ISAT exams would be high stakes exams.

When President Bush signed NCLB in early January 2002, it became crystal clear that the 2002 ISAT would be the NCLB exam for Illinois. Further, the state announced in February that, for the purpose of calculating how long each school had failed to meet AYP under NCLB, 1999 would be designated as the baseline year and school status in

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<sup>13</sup> The ISAT was not a “no stakes” exam in 1999-2001. ISAT performance played a small role in the CPS rules for school accountability over this time, and the state monitored ISAT performance as well. Nonetheless, according to Phil Hansen, Chicago’s former Chief Accountability Officer, CPS began participating in ISAT under the understanding that the results would not be part of any “high stakes accountability plan.” In late fall 1999, the state made several announcements that signaled a change in this position and CPS protested. Then, in January of 2000, ISBE moderated its stance and informed CPS that it would appoint a Task Force to recommend a “comprehensive school designation system” for state-level accountability and a set of guidelines that would exempt schools with low ISAT scores from being placed on the state’s Academic Early Warning List if they “show evidence of continued improvement.” Thus, in the springs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, CPS took the ISAT with the expectation that the results would not have significant direct consequences in terms of the state accountability system.

the year 2000 would retroactively count as the first year of accountability. This meant that many schools in Chicago expected to start to face sanctions if their proficiency counts on the 2002 spring ISAT exams did not improve significantly. Thus, in one year, the ISAT went from a relatively low-stakes state assessment to a decidedly high stakes exam.

Like the 1996 CPS reforms, the No Child Left Behind Act employs proficiency counts as the key metric of school performance. States are required to institute a statewide annual standardized test in grades three through eight, subject to parameters set by the U. S. Department of Education. States set their own proficiency standards as well as a schedule of target levels for the percent of proficient students at the school level. If the fraction of proficient students in a school is above the goal, the school is said to have met the standard for “Adequate Yearly Progress” (AYP).<sup>14</sup> Under some circumstances, if a school does not have enough proficient students in the current year, but a substantially higher fraction than in previous years, the school may be considered to have met the AYP standard under what is called the “Safe Harbor Provision.” If a school persistently fails to meet the AYP requirement, it will face increasing sanctions. These include mandatory offering of public-school choice and extra services for current students, and at some point, the school may face reconstitution.<sup>15</sup>

We are not able to conduct our analyses of ISAT scores using a sample restricted to students who took the exact same form of the exam. ISBE typically administered ISAT using two forms simultaneously. These forms shared a large number of common items both within and across years, and thus the assessment program was designed in a manner that facilitated ISBE’s use of an Item Response Theory model to place all scores on a common scale from 120 – 200. We cannot control for any form effects in our ISAT analyses because the CPS data that we use do not allow us to determine which form a given student took in a given year. Nonetheless, we note that an independent audit of the ISAT did conclude that ISAT scores are comparable over time and among forms of the exam.<sup>16</sup>

### **3) Changes in Scores**

All the figures presented in this section follow a common format. They display differences between mean test scores in a specific grade following the introduction of high stakes testing and mean predicted scores based on data from the period prior to high stakes testing. We create our estimation samples using selection rules that take the following form: we include persons who were enrolled in CPS in year  $t$  and year  $t+2$  in grades  $n$  and  $n+2$  respectively, and we restrict our samples to students who were tested in

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<sup>14</sup> In addition, the fraction of students passing in each subgroup above a minimum size must meet the standard. NCLB defines subgroups by race, socio-economic status, and special education category.

<sup>15</sup> The period of sanctions (years 3-7) are sometimes referred to as years 1-5 of “school improvement status.” Reconstitution is possible at the end of this 5 year period.

<sup>16</sup> Wick (2003) provides a technical audit of the ISAT.

math and reading in both years. Appendix A provides a detailed description of how we construct our samples and the characteristics of our treatment and control samples.<sup>17</sup>

With regard to our analyses of the CPS accountability system, the two-year intervals reflect the fact that 1994, 1996, and 1998 are years centered around the 1996 reform that involve assessment using the same form of the ITBS. We present results for fifth and sixth graders because these are the cohorts tested in 1998 that did not face any promotion hurdles under the CPS reforms in 1996 or 1997. The two-year interval is also necessary in our analyses of the 2002 implementation of NCLB. ISBE administered the ISAT in only third, fifth, and eighth grades. We cannot analyze eighth grade scores in the pre-NCLB period given controls for fifth grade achievement because the ISAT was first administered in 1999, but we can use the third grade scores from 1999 and the fifth grade scores from 2001 to estimate the pre-NCLB relationship between ISAT scores in fifth and third grades.<sup>18</sup>

In all our analyses, we compare outcomes in a specific grade for two different cohorts of students. Both cohorts took tests in two grades, and both cohorts took their tests in the lower grade under low stakes. However, the latter cohort took exams in the higher grade under high stakes. For our ISAT results, these stakes reflect Illinois' 2002 implementation of NCLB. For our ITBS results, these stakes reflect the 1996 introduction of CPS's accountability system. Our goal is to examine how test scores in the higher grade change following the introduction of an accountability system based on proficiency counts controlling for achievement in the lower grade, and we are particularly interested in the possibility that the effects of accountability may differ among various levels of prior student achievement in the lower grade.

For the purpose of describing our estimation procedure, we refer to the cohorts tested in both grades under low stakes as the pre-reform cohorts and the cohorts tested under high stakes in the higher grade as the post-reform cohorts. For each set of results presented below, we begin by using a pre-reform cohort to estimate the first principal component of math and reading scores in the baseline grade. We use this principal component as an index that allows us to order students in the pre-reform cohort on a one-dimensional scale of overall baseline achievement. We then use the coefficient estimates from this principal component analysis and the lower grade math and reading scores from the post-reform cohort to construct indices of baseline achievement for students in the post-reform cohort as well. These indices tell us where the post-reform students would

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<sup>17</sup> We use the last year a student was in third grade as their third grade year. We obtain similar results if we use test scores from the first year of third grade.

<sup>18</sup> In an earlier version of this paper, we also presented comparisons between the 1999-2001 cohort and the 2001-2003 cohort. However, we subsequently learned that the interval between the 2001 third grade test and the 2003 fifth grade test was shorter than the intervals for the cohorts that we deal with here. While the patterns in these results are quite similar to those presented in Figures 2a-2b, we cannot rule out the possibility that the difference in time between assessments as well as other differences in test administration for the 2001-2003 samples affect those results.

be in the distribution of baseline achievement for the pre-reform cohort. Next, we divide the pre- and post-reform samples into ten cells. In both cohorts, the first cell contains students whose math and reading scores in the lower grade place them in the first decile of the pre-reform baseline achievement distribution in CPS. The second cell contains those who scores place them in the second decile, and we define the third through tenth cells analogously.

Given these cells, we run twenty separate regressions. For each of our 10 samples of pre-reform students, we run two regressions of the form<sup>19</sup>

$$y_{igk} = \beta_1 y_{i(g-2)math} + \beta_2 y_{i(g-2)read} + \beta_3 (y_{i(g-2)math} * y_{i(g-2)read}) + u_{igk}$$

where  $y_{igk}$  is the score of student  $i$  in grade  $g$  on the assessment in subject  $k$ . As an example, in our analyses of the ISBE implementation of NCLB,  $k$  is either math or reading, and  $g$  equals 5. Using the estimated coefficients from these regressions, we form predicted scores,  $\hat{y}_{igk}$ , for each person in the post-reform cohort and then form the differences between these predicted values,  $\hat{y}_{igk}$ , and the actual grade  $g$  scores in math and reading for the post-reform cohort. Finally, we calculate the average of these differences in math and reading for each of our ten samples of students in the post-reform cohort.<sup>20</sup>

## NCLB Results

Figures 2a-2b present our estimates of the changes in fifth grade math and reading scores associated with the 2002 implementation of NCLB in Illinois. For students whose third grade scores place them in the bottom two deciles of the 1999 achievement distribution, there is no evidence that NCLB led to higher ISAT scores. Three of the four estimated treatment effects for these deciles are negative. The only statistically significant estimated effect implies that fifth graders in 2002, whose third grade scores placed them in the bottom decile of the 1999 third grade achievement distribution, scored just over one half point lower in math than expected given the observed relationship between third grade scores in 1999 and fifth grade scores in 2001. Because the ISAT

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<sup>19</sup> We have also estimated each of our regression models including additional controls for race, gender, and free-lunch eligibility, and we found that our results were virtually unchanged.

<sup>20</sup> The bands in the figures are 95 percent confidence intervals. We calculate these intervals accounting for the fact that we must estimate what the expected score for each student would have been in the absence of NCLB. We obtain the adjustments to the variances of our estimates of mean cell differences by taking the sample average of the elements of the matrix  $(Z\hat{\Omega}Z')$  where  $N$  is the number of fifth grade observations in 2002,  $Z$  is the  $N \times 3$  matrix of third grade score variables used to produce predicted scores, and  $\hat{\Omega}$  is the estimated variance covariance matrix from the regression of 2001 fifth grade math or reading scores on these third grade variables from 1999.

scale is designed to generate a standard deviation of 15 for all scores, this estimated effect represents a decline of roughly 0.04 standard deviations. In contrast, deciles three through nine enjoy higher than expected ISAT scores in both math and reading. We observe the largest score gains in math and reading in the sixth decile where fifth graders in 2002 scored just under 0.1 standard deviations higher in reading and more than 0.13 standard deviations higher in math than comparable fifth graders scored in 2001.

Figure 2c presents the expected proficiency rates in math and reading for each of the deciles included in Figures 2a and 2b.<sup>21</sup> These are the rates expected given the third grade performance of students who were in fifth grade in 2002 and the relationship between third and fifth grade performance for the 2001 cohort of fifth graders. For example, the figure tells us that, in the absence of NCLB, the fifth graders in 2002 who fell in the fifth decile of our baseline achievement distribution would have faced just over a twenty percent chance of reaching the proficiency standard for math and just under a thirty-five percent chance of reaching the reading standard.

In light of Figure 2c, we are not surprised that we did not find that an increase in ISAT scores in 2002 among students in the bottom two deciles. The Illinois proficiency standards are lofty goals for these students, and they face less than a ten percent chance of reaching either standard. The fact that we do find significant positive effects for students in the third decile suggests that students may benefit from these types of reforms even if they have at best modest hopes of reaching the threshold for proficiency. This may reflect spillover effects that are not present in our model above, or these results may reflect differences in potential achievement growth among the students in each decile that are unmeasured yet still observed by teachers. In any event, Figures 2a-2c demonstrate that students with the lowest levels of prior achievement did not appear to achieve higher ISAT scores following NCLB, and among these students, the Illinois proficiency standards represented almost unattainable goals. Taken as a whole, these results support our contention that NCLB is not designed to leave no child behind.

### **Interpretation and Robustness of the NCLB Results**

Several issues regarding the interpretation of our results deserve further attention. First, Figures 2a-2b present estimated changes in the scores on specific assessments. We can state clearly that the ISBE implementation of NCLB worked better, in terms of raising ISAT scores, for some students than others and that it may have been counterproductive among the least able students in CPS, and it is worth noting that this claim does not rest on a particular choice of scaling for the ISAT scores. We find no evidence of positive effects among students in the bottom two deciles but clear evidence of significant increases in ISAT scores among students in deciles three through nine. If all the estimated effects were the same sign, we might worry that any comparisons among cells concerning the magnitude of estimated effects could be sensitive to our choice of

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<sup>21</sup> These expected proficiency rates are predicted values based on the estimated coefficients from a logit model of fifth grade proficiency in 2001 given third grade math and reading scores in 1999.

scale for reporting test scores, but our main emphasis here is a qualitative claim, not a quantitative claim. Scores are higher than expected for students who are in the middle of the baseline achievement distribution and scores are the same or lower than expected for those at the bottom of this distribution. Although NCLB raised average ISAT scores in Chicago, the implementation of NCLB in Chicago did not help and may have hurt the children who were likely the farthest behind when they began school. Our model above suggests that this outcome should not be a surprise, but it is also not consistent with the stated purpose of NCLB.

We would like to conduct placebo experiments using ISAT data from the years before 2002 in order to rule out the possibility that we are simply picking up pre-existing differences among ability levels in the trends of third to fifth grade changes in test scores among CPS students. However, this is not possible because only three years of ISAT data exist prior to 2002, and we need four years of data to measure differences in third to fifth achievement trajectories between two cohorts of students. Nonetheless, we can construct comparisons in reading and math using two cohorts tested under the same policy regime. The 2005 and 2004 cohorts of fifth graders were tested in both fifth and third grade under NCLB. Thus, we construct figures describing changes in fifth grade scores between 2005 and 2004 in order to examine changes in scores between two cohorts tested under similar policy regimes. Figures 3a-3b do not offer even a hint of the clear pattern that is observed in Figures 2a-2b. We see sizeable losses in reading and some noteworthy gains in math among the top deciles, but there is no common pattern for math and reading results, and there is no evidence of important gains in the middle of the distribution relative to the lower deciles. We do not know why there are some statistically significant deviations from zero in these figures. In any pair of years, especially during the early years of a new policy regime, there may be differences in test administration or curricular priorities that create such differences. Our main point is that these figures describe differences between two cohorts that experienced broadly similar accountability environments, and these differences in no way fit the pattern observed in Figures 2a-2b. In contrast, the next section describes our estimates of the effects of the 1996 CPS reforms, and when we examine changes associated with the introduction of another accountability system built around cutoff scores, the pattern observed in Figures 2a-2b appears again.

There are over 400 elementary schools in Chicago and roughly 2000 fifth grade students per year in each of our baseline achievement deciles. We cannot simply add school fixed effects to our empirical model without losing a significant number of observations because many schools are represented in a given achievement cell in 2002 but not in 2001. Nonetheless, we can estimate the relationships between fifth and third grade scores for the 2001-1999 cohort within broader ability cells while including school fixed effects. Using only within school variation in student outcomes, we find results that are quite similar to those in Figures 2a-2b.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> We used four groups: deciles one and two, three through five, six through eight, and nine and ten. We employed a richer polynomial in third grade achievement scores to compensate for the use of four broader regression cells instead of ten. We still calculate

We have also constructed similar graphs while restricting our samples to schools that are comparable in terms of their expected proficiency rates prior to NCLB. Over a number of different types of schools, we find no clear evidence that students in the bottom deciles of the overall baseline achievement distribution benefit from the introduction of NCLB. There is suggestive but not statistically significant evidence that students at the bottom of the achievement distribution do slightly better if they attend a school with expected proficiency rates of less than 25%. In these schools, the relative shortage of students near or above the proficiency standards may create a need to target students farther down in the distribution of prior achievement as part of plans to achieve AYP. While this pattern is at most suggestive, we do find, as we expect, clear and noteworthy gains among students in the middle deciles of baseline achievement regardless of whether or not schools are under modest or great pressure from NCLB's AYP rules.

We find that NCLB is always associated with increases in overall average scores for schools.<sup>23</sup> Thus, our results are consistent with the large body of research that finds positive impacts of accountability systems on average test scores at the state, district, or school level, but our results demonstrate that, even if such systems cause average test scores to increase in all schools, there may exist groups of students in each school who are either harmed or receive no benefits.

The results in Figures 2a-2b above are also robust to different methods of measuring the heterogeneous effects of NCLB on test scores. Within each of the ten baseline achievement cells we construct, we treat the effect of NCLB as a constant, given controls for third grade reading and math scores, and we focus on differences among cells in the estimated effects of NCLB. However, we have also used local linear regression methods to estimate the plots in our figures as continuous functions.<sup>24</sup> The patterns that emerge are quite similar, but as one would expect, the local linear regression methods yield smoother plots that more closely resemble a unimodal density function. We also examined numerous mean differences in pre- and post-reform test scores for samples of students grouped according to their third grade test scores. For example, we broke up the ISAT score scale into 5 regions and then placed each student into one of the 25 cells defined by the intersection of these 5 levels of achievement for math and reading. Then, for each cell, we calculated the difference between pre-reform and post-reform scores in fifth grade. These differences are always negative for students who are at the lowest levels of reading and math in the third grade and always positive for many cells that

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average treatment effects for each decile to facilitate comparisons with our other results. These figures are available upon request.

<sup>23</sup> We grouped schools according to what their 5<sup>th</sup> grade proficiency rates in math or reading would have been given their 2001 scores. Schools in our lowest achieving groups reported proficiency rates of less than 25 percent in either math or reading.

<sup>24</sup> Further, we have conducted these analyses using 20 cells instead of ten. The results follow the same pattern observed in Figures 2a-2b, and the worst outcomes are always observed among students in the bottom 5% of the third grade achievement distribution.

involve the middle range of math and reading scores. Regardless of the methods we have used to define baseline ability cells or estimate treatment effects, we have found no evidence of gains in math or reading scores among students at the bottom of the third grade achievement distribution, and this is also true regarding our analyses of changes in fifth grade scores following the 1996 reforms with CPS.

Figures 2a-2c provide only indirect support for our model because we do not have direct measures of teacher effort, and other mechanisms could generate the patterns we observe in these figures. If schools, in response to NCLB, picked curricula that worked best for students near proficiency and less well for the most and least able students, a similar pattern might emerge. Nonetheless, any alternative explanation for our results must explain how NCLB leads to changes in educational practice that benefit many students but not students with the lowest levels of prior achievement.<sup>25</sup>

### **Effects of the 1996 CPS Reforms**

Figures 4a-4b present estimates of the effects of the 1996 CPS reforms on reading and math scores in fifth grade. Here, we are comparing the performance of students tested in 1998 with the performance that we would have expected from similar students in 1996. The results for fifth grade reading in Figure 4a represent the effects of policy changes that most closely resemble NCLB. CPS put reading first in their reform effort and made school level probation decisions based primarily on proficiency counts in reading. Further, fifth graders did not face a threat of summer school if they did poorly on the ITBS, and thus the CPS efforts to end social promotion, which are not part of NCLB, should not have affected results for fifth graders to the same degree that they affected the performance of students in sixth or eighth grade. Fifth grade teachers and parents may well have responded to the promotion hurdles that awaited these students as sixth graders in 1999. However, we do not expect fifth grade students to make significant changes in their focus and effort based on the consequences attached to sixth grade exams because children discount the future heavily at this age. This creates an important difference between our fifth and sixth grade results.<sup>26</sup> In a standard model of student effort, students will increase their effort in response to an immediate threat of summer school if the cost of such an increase is offset by a significant reduction in the likelihood of attending summer school, and we will see that our results for sixth graders are consistent with this hypothesis.

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<sup>25</sup> In our model, no student should ever be harmed directly by the introduction of an accountability system because we have made the strong assumption that districts perfectly monitor some baseline level of effort before and after the introduction of accountability, and we do not model group instruction or related choices concerning curricular selection or the pace of instruction. Nonetheless, if schools responded to NCLB by tailoring all group instruction to the needs of students near the proficiency standard, other students could be harmed directly.

<sup>26</sup> We do not analyze seventh grade scores in 1998 because the sixth grade promotion hurdle in 1997 is a source of endogenous composition changes in the 1998 seventh grade sample.

The pattern of results in Figure 4a is quite similar to the pattern observed in our analyses of NCLB. Here, the scale is in grade equivalents, and a 0.1 change represents roughly one month of additional achievement. The overall standard deviations of fifth grade scores in our 2002 samples are roughly 1.2 for math and 1.5 for reading. Thus, estimated achievement gains of 0.1 or slightly more for several cells in the middle of the ability distribution are noteworthy. Still, we find zero or negative estimated achievement effects among students in either tail. Further, Figure 4b shows a similar but slightly less dramatic pattern of changes in fifth grade math scores. The CPS proficiency standards were slightly more demanding than the ISAT proficiency standards used in 2002, and thus, it is noteworthy that fifth grade ITBS scores did increase among students in the third decile of the prior achievement distribution even though one would have expected less than 5 percent of these students to pass either the math or reading thresholds in the pre-reform period. Nonetheless, the teachers and parents of these students knew that they would face a promotion hurdle as sixth graders in 1999, and as we demonstrate below, the standards for promotion were within the reach of these students.

Figures 5a-5b present results for sixth graders.<sup>27</sup> Here, we are clearly not measuring just the effects of the school probation rules and the public reporting of proficiency counts in local newspapers. We anticipate that the rules governing summer school attendance and retention decisions shaped not only the actions of teachers and parents but also the effort of students during the school year. Students in sixth grade faced summer school if they performed below certain targets in reading or math, and these targets were much lower than the proficiency standards used to measure school performance. Taking all of these factors into account, we are not surprised that, while our results for sixth graders follow the same overall pattern observed among fifth graders, the estimated sixth grade gains associated the CPS reforms are larger at every decile in both math and reading, and there is some evidence of gains even in the lowest decile. Figure 5c is similar to Figure 2c except it plots, for each decile, the probabilities of exceeding the summer school cutoffs for sixth graders.

The striking difference between Figures 2c and 5c may offer some insight concerning why estimated gains from accountability in Figures 5a and 5b are more apparent in the lower deciles of the achievement distribution. Even students in the lowest decile of fourth grade achievement had almost a twenty percent chance of reaching the individual math or reading cutoffs that determined summer school attendance after sixth grade, and White and Rosenbaum (2007) suggest that, among sixth graders, CPS schools targeted their instructional efforts toward students who could avoid summer school only if they made progress during the school year.<sup>28</sup> We argue in section one that less

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<sup>27</sup> As we did in our analyses of the ISAT data, we estimated models of ITBS achievement that included school fixed effects and models that included additional controls for race, gender, and free-lunch eligibility. Results from these alternative specifications are quite similar to those in Figures 4a-5b.

<sup>28</sup> However, it is not completely clear that the least able CPS students benefited from this program. In a previous version of the paper, we presented results for twenty prior

demanding proficiency targets can increase the amount of attention that teachers devote to less able students, and the contrast between our results for fifth and sixth grades is consistent with our conjecture. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that even students at the lowest levels of prior achievement simply worked harder than similar students in previous cohorts because they wanted to avoid summer school.

Figures 5a-5b indicate that students in the third and fourth deciles of prior achievement scores scored over 0.2 higher in math and reading than one would have expected prior to the 1996 reforms. These are large effects since 0.2 represents two full months of achievement on the ITBS grade-equivalent scale, and it is worth noting that Figure 5c implies that CPS set the summer school cutoff scores such that students in these deciles faced both a significant chance of avoiding summer school as well as a significant chance of attending summer school depending on how they progressed during the year.<sup>29</sup>

We noted earlier that the 1996 eighth grade exams do not provide a completely clean measure of pre-reform performance. Nonetheless, these students also faced a promotion hurdle in 1998, and we include Appendix Figures 1a and 1b, which describe changes in scores among eighth grade students. The overall pattern of results is similar to the pattern in Figures 5a and 5b. However, among eighth graders, there is less evidence of significant reading gains in the upper half of the prior achievement distribution.

#### **4) Potential Reforms to Accountability Systems**

The central lesson of the model and empirical work presented here is that an accountability system built around proficiency counts may not help students who are currently far above or far below these thresholds. In this section, we ask whether or not recent proposals for changing the AYP system can help make NCLB a policy that generates improved instruction for all students. We assume that the goal of NCLB or related accountability programs is to induce a uniform increase in the amount of extra instruction that teachers give to students of all abilities. We acknowledge that there is no reason to believe that increasing the effort allocated to each student by the same amount is socially optimal. However, by analyzing how different AYP scoring systems influence the allocation of teacher effort relative to this standard, we illustrate the key issues that

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achievement cells. The estimated sixth grade effects for those in the bottom 5% of the ability distribution were quite close to zero and not statistically significant. See Roderick and Engel (2001) for more work on the motivational responses of low-achieving children to the retention policy in CPS.

<sup>29</sup> Becker and Rosen (1992) apply insights from Lazear and Rosen's (1981) tournament model to the design of academic testing systems that determine rewards and punishments for students. They argue that less able students will not be affected by these systems if they have no realistic chance of ever reaching these key cutoff scores. Thus, the decision by CPS to set modest standards for grade promotion may have been advantageous for generating more effort among low-achieving students.

designers of accountability systems must face when trying to elicit any particular distribution of effort that may be deemed desirable.

Education policy makers are currently devoting significant attention to two alternatives schemes for measuring AYP at the school level. First, several states have adopted “indexing” systems based on multiple thresholds.<sup>30</sup> In such a system, students who score above the highest threshold contribute, as in other states, one passing score toward the school’s proficiency count. However, students who fall short of this highest threshold but do manage to exceed lower thresholds count as varying fractions of a passing student depending on how many thresholds they meet. Other states have adopted value-added systems that measure how much scores have improved, on average, between two test dates.<sup>31</sup>

These approaches do not build in strong incentives to focus attention only on students near a single proficiency standard, and one can easily construct examples in which these systems will mitigate the number of students who receive no extra attention under NCLB. However, even if NCLB incorporated the most sophisticated variants of these systems imaginable, it is possible that some groups of students would still not benefit from NCLB. Further, even if one considers the ideal systems for indexing or value-added, there are important tradeoffs between the two approaches.

Using the notation from section 2 above, we will make these two points within the context of our model of effort choice. Consider the following problems that could be faced by the teachers in a given school. Once again, we assume that there are many students in the school, and thus we treat the expected sum of test scores over all students as the actual total sum of scores in the school:

$$(2) \quad \min_{e_i} \quad \mathbb{I} \left[ \frac{1}{T^u} \sum_{i=1}^N E(t_i) \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N c e_i$$

$T^u$  is the maximum possible score on the high stakes assessment, and we normalize the floor of the scale to 0. Here,

$$t_i = \min[(T^u, \max(0, t_i = e_i + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_i)]$$

Thus, all scores are constrained to be between the floor and ceiling of the scale used for assessment, i.e.  $t_i \in [0, T^u] \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ . In a complete analysis of (2) and (3) below, we would need to address the fact that the relationship between  $e_i$  and the expected value

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<sup>30</sup> As of spring 2007, these include AL, FL, IA, LA, MA, MI, MN, MS, NH, NM, OK, PA, RI, SC, VT, WI, WY. NY also has a small indexing component in their system.

<sup>31</sup> As of spring 2007, AR, DE, FL, NC, and TN are doing so. AZ, CA, AK, HI, NV, OH, and UT have applied to do so but have not been approved.

of student  $i$ 's test score may be a function of both the floor and ceiling on the test scale. However, in our discussion, we will assume that the tests in question are designed to ensure that neither the floor nor ceiling on the scale is relevant for investment decisions regarding students, regardless of student ability.<sup>32</sup>

In the index system described by (2), proficiency for a given student is no longer zero or one but rather the student's score expressed as a fraction of the maximum score, and the penalty function  $I[\cdot]$  describes how sanctions decline, for a school of size  $N$ , as the total proficiency count of the school increases. This indexing system resembles those used in some states, but it differs in two ways. First, the indexing is continuous so that all score increases count the same toward the school's proficiency score regardless of a student's initial ability,  $\alpha_i$ .<sup>33</sup> Second, because we have set the standard for proficiency at the maximum possible score and assumed this score is never reached, we have eliminated the existence of students for whom  $e_i = 0$  simply because they are already too accomplished relative to the proficiency standard. In sum, this is an indexing system designed to eliminate as much as possible any incentives schools may face to ignore students of a particular ability level.

The characterization of indexing in (2) is also useful because we can easily compare it into the following value-added system:

$$(3) \quad \min_{e_i} \Gamma \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N (E(t_i) - \bar{\alpha}) \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N c e_i$$

Here,  $\bar{\alpha}$  is the average performance in the school on a previous assessment. Because of the linearity in our model, equation (3) describes a value-added system in which schools of a given size are rewarded or sanctioned according to  $\Gamma(\cdot)$  based on their total net improvement in student achievement. With regard to the goal of leaving no child behind, both of these systems represent the best of all possible worlds in many respects. A one-point increase in the expected score of any given student makes the same contribution to the school's standing under the accountability system regardless of the student's initial achievement level. Further, because we abstract from any effects caused by floors or ceilings on the test scale, the linearity assumptions in these models ensure that the

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<sup>32</sup> The existence of floors or ceilings implies that there may exist regions of ability types at the top and bottom of the ability distribution such that the return to investment in students is diminished because their observed scores are likely to remain at the ceiling or floor even if their latent scores improve. By ignoring these possibilities, we are implicitly assuming that the distribution of ability types and the distribution of measurement errors are bounded in a manner that makes the floor and ceiling scores unattainable given the optimal vector of effort choices.

<sup>33</sup> We do not think of ability as a fixed endowment but rather as the level of competency at the beginning of a given school year, which should reflect investments made by both schools and parents in previous years.

marginal effort cost of increasing a student's test score is the same regardless of the level of the student's initial ability.

Nonetheless, even in this setting, it is easy to construct examples such that the optimal vector of effort allocations for both of the problems above includes increased attention for only some students. In fact, there could be many such optimal vectors for a given school, and these models are silent concerning exactly which students might receive  $e_i = 0$ .<sup>34</sup> The key point is that, given a penalty function and the initial distribution of talent in a school of a given size, there will be a specific total sum of test scores or a total proficiency score such that the marginal cost of raising the total beyond this point is greater than the reduction in sanctions associated with such an increase, and there is nothing in the structure of this problem that guarantees  $e_i > 0$  for all  $i$  at this point. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that schools will target only a subset of students in their efforts to avoid sanctions.

To some extent, this result is driven by our assumption that expected test scores increase linearly with teacher effort. Given this assumption, schools can achieve the same AYP status at the same cost by investing a great amount in a few students or smaller amounts in a larger number of students. If we assume that the cost of increasing the expected score of a given student by any increment  $\tau$  is strictly convex in  $\tau$ , it is easy to construct scenarios such that schools will respond to the systems described in (2) or (3) by increasing the amount of extra instruction given to each student in a uniform manner.

If one is willing to assume that it does cost more to raise one student's score by two points than two students' scores by one point each, our discussion highlights the promise of both indexing and value-added systems as means for eliciting improved allocations of teacher effort to all students and not just those near proficiency standards. However, indexing and value-added are not equally desirable on all dimensions. Under any system that ties rewards and sanctions to levels of achievement, including a continuous indexing system, the minimized sum of effort costs and sanctions borne by the staff is a function of the distribution of prior student achievement in the school. Thus, it may be difficult to design an index system that challenges the best schools without setting goals for disadvantaged schools that are not attainable given their resources. The Clotfelter et al. (2004) results suggest that, when indexing systems set unattainable goals for schools in disadvantaged communities, these systems may actually do harm by causing these schools to lose the teachers they need most. Under the value-added system described in (3), the total cost of achieving the optimal proficiency score is not affected by the distribution of initial ability.<sup>35</sup> Thus, it might be possible to use such a value-

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<sup>34</sup> If ceiling and floor effects on the test scale are important, this is not the case. In this case, returns from investing in the most able and least able students are diminished.

<sup>35</sup> This can be shown easily by substituting the formula for  $t_i$  into (3), if one assumes that the floor and ceiling on the test scale are never binding at the optimal effort vector.

added system to increase the quality of instruction for all students without distorting the supply of teachers among schools.<sup>36</sup>

Still, value-added methods are not a panacea. To begin, value-added measures are often much noisier than measures of the current level of student performance. In principle, one could address this concern by developing more reliable assessments, but it is important to note that teachers may well demand increases in other aspects of their compensation if their standing under an accountability system is greatly influenced by the measurement error in performance measures.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, the absence of a natural scale for knowledge makes value-added methods inherently problematic. Reardon (2007) uses data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study – Kindergarten cohort (ECLS-K) to show that measured differences between the magnitude of the black-white test score gap in first grade and fifth grade among a single cohort of students can be quite sensitive to the specific scale used to report the scores, even if all scores from all candidate scales are standardized to have a mean of zero and a variance of one. The ECLS-K data do not permit researchers to make meaningful statements about how much bigger the black-white test score gap is among fifth graders than among first graders because there is no natural metric for knowledge that gives cardinal meaning to the distance between two scores. Since value-added measures are measures of achievement growth for a population of students, the claim that value-added is greater in school A than school B is a claim that, on average, achievement growth was greater in school A than school B during the past year. But, if it is difficult to make robust judgments concerning whether or not achievement growth was greater among white students than black students in a nationally representative panel, it will also be difficult to make robust judgments concerning the relative magnitudes of average achievement growth in different schools.<sup>38</sup>

In the end, designers of accountability systems face an important tradeoff. Any index system built around cutoff scores will make it more costly to attract teachers to teach in disadvantaged schools as long as all schools are held to the same proficiency standards. On the other hand, systems built around value-added measures will provide incentives and hand out sanctions based on performance measures that may be noisy and linked to inherently arbitrary choices concerning scales. Nonetheless, both approaches do reward schools for improving the achievement of students who are not able to reach a

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<sup>36</sup> Here, we are implicitly assuming that the increase in the effort cost of teaching will not generate a decline in teacher quality that offsets the increased effort given by remaining teachers.

<sup>37</sup> See Kane and Staiger (2002) for more on problems caused by measurement error in value-added systems.

<sup>38</sup> Reardon's (2007) results are driven, in part, by the fact that the typical black student is making gains over a different region of the scale than the typical white student. Because students sort among schools on ability, a similar problem arises when measuring relative achievement growth among schools.

high proficiency standard in the near term, and thus both methods may reduce the incentives some schools currently face to leave the least able behind.<sup>39</sup>

Yet, we must note that the process of using test scores to create performance measures for teachers or schools involves collapsing the information in a large matrix of test scores or test scores changes into a one dimensional performance index that ranks schools or teachers from the best performing to the worst performing, and any method for doing this implicitly involves the choice of a great number of weights. As one clearly identifies these weights, one faces many difficult questions about the design of test-based accountability systems. For example, given any particular scaling of the tests involved, how does the performance of students at varying levels of baseline achievement contribute to these rankings? If teaching gifted students requires a different set of skills than teaching average students or academically disadvantaged students, and students are sorted by prior achievement into classes and schools, how can one meaningfully place all schools or teachers on a common performance scale, since all teachers and schools are not really doing the same job? Our model and empirical results highlight the effects of building accountability systems around proficiency counts. Much work remains before researchers can make clear statements about how the optimal design of accountability systems, given various policy objectives.

## 5) Conclusion

A significant ethnographic literature documents instances in specific schools where schools responded to accountability systems by targeting so-called "bubble kids" for extra help while simultaneously providing no special attention to students who were already proficient or unlikely to become proficient given feasible interventions. Here, we use unique data from Chicago that permits us to cleanly measure how the entire distribution of student achievement changes following the introduction of accountability systems built around proficiency counts. Our findings are quite consistent with the conclusions in the ethnographic literature, and we are the first to document educational triage on a large scale by comparing cohorts of students who took the same exams under different accountability regimes.

Our results do not suggest that NCLB has failed to improve performance among all academically disadvantaged students in Chicago. Figures 2a and 2b show that 2002 ISAT test scores among fifth graders were higher than one would have expected prior to

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<sup>39</sup> However, the systems described here require a team of incredibly skilled test developers. The test scales in (2) and (3) above are such that the effort cost of increasing an individual's score is the same for all students regardless of their initial achievement level. Given any system adopted in practice, differences in the costs of improving student scores by particular increments at different points on a given scale will influence the allocation of effort among students and will also mean that the effort cost of responding to the accountability system will differ among schools because it will be a function of the distribution of prior achievement at the school level.

NCLB over most of the prior achievement distribution, and it is important to note that even CPS students in the fourth decile of the third grade achievement distribution faced just over 20% and just under 15% chances of being proficient in reading and math respectively prior to NCLB. Thus, many low-achieving students in Chicago appear to have done better on ISAT under NCLB than they would have otherwise. However, for at least the bottom 20% of students, there is little evidence of significant gains and a possibility of lower than expected scores in math. If we assume that similar results hold for all elementary grades now tested under NCLB, we have reason to believe that at a given point in time there are more than 25,000 CPS students being left behind by NCLB.

This large number is the result of several factors interacting together. First, as a state, Illinois has set standards that are challenging for disadvantaged students. According to a 2003 report by the Chicago Consortium on School Research, Easton et al. (2003), just over half of the nation's fifth graders would be expected to achieve the ISAT proficiency standard in reading and just under half would be expected to achieve the ISAT standard in math. Second, students in Chicago are quite disadvantaged. More than 80 percent of CPS students receive free or reduced-price lunch benefits. Third, CPS is one of the largest districts in the country. We do not have data on individual test scores from other states, and we cannot assess the extent to which our results from Chicago reflect a pattern that is common among other school districts in other states. However, we have reasons to believe that while the pattern of NCLB effects we have identified may not be ubiquitous, it also not unique to Chicago.

New York City, Los Angeles, Cleveland and many other cities educate large populations of disadvantaged students in states with accountability systems that are roughly comparable to the 2002 system implemented in Illinois.<sup>40</sup> Based on our results, it is reasonable to conjecture that hundreds of thousands of academically disadvantaged students in large cities are currently being left behind because the use of proficiency counts in NCLB does not provide strong incentives for schools to direct more attention toward them. Further, NCLB may be generating this type of educational triage in non-urban districts as well.<sup>41</sup> Any school that views AYP as a binding constraint and also educates a significant number of students who have little hope of reaching proficiency faces a strong incentive to shift attention away from their lowest achieving students and toward students near proficiency.

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<sup>40</sup> See NCES report 2007-482. On the other hand, Boston, Detroit, and Philadelphia are in states that use index systems to calculate AYP. Further, Houston, Dallas and other cities in Texas face a state accountability system built around proficiency standards that are not as demanding as the 2002 standards in Illinois and possibly more "in reach" for disadvantaged students.

<sup>41</sup> Commercial software now exists that makes it easier for schools to monitor and improve their AYP status. See <http://www.schoolnet.com> for an example. Schools that wish to create lists of students who are most likely to become proficient given extra instruction can easily do so.

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Figure 1: Optimal Effort Among Types




Figure 2a: Change in 5th Grade Reading Scores, 2002 vs. 2001




Figure 2b: Change in 5th Grade Math Scores, 2002 vs. 2001






Figure 2c:  
Expected 2002 Proficiency in 5th Grade  
By Deciles of the 3rd Grade Achievement Distribution for 1999



**Figure 3a: Placebo Test:  
Change in 5th Grade Reading Scores, 2005 vs. 2004**



**Figure 3b: Placebo Test:  
Change in 5th Grade Math Scores, 2005 vs. 2004**




Figure 4a: Change in 5th Grade Reading Scores, 1998 vs. 1996






Figure 4b: Change in 5th Grade Math Scores, 1998 vs. 1996



**Figure 5a: Change in 6th Grade Reading Scores, 1998 vs. 1996**



**Figure 5b: Change in 6th Grade Math Scores, 1998 vs. 1996**







Figure 5c:  
Expected 1998 Pass Rates in 6th Grade - Summer School Cutoffs  
By Deciles of the 4th Grade Achievement Distribution for 1994



**Appendix Figure 1a: Change in 8th Grade Reading Scores, 1998 vs. 1996**



**Appendix Figure 1b: Change in 8th Grade Math Scores, 1998 vs. 1996**



## Appendix A: Data Construction

In our analyses of the effects of NCLB, we restrict our samples to students who were tested in fifth grade in 2002, the first year of NCLB, or 2001. We further restrict the sample to students who were last tested in third grade exactly two years prior. Here, we discuss two alternative procedures.

First, we could have simply selected the first or last third grade test available for each fifth grade student in our 2001 and 2002 samples without restricting the sample interval between scores. We chose not to pursue this strategy because the ISAT test was not given until 1999. Students tested in fifth grade in 2001 who entered third grade in 1998 and then either repeated part or all of third grade or fourth grade do not have an ISAT score for their initial third grade year, and depending on the details of their grade progression, may not have a third grade ISAT score at all. This is not true among similar students who entered third grade in 1999 and were tested as fifth graders in 2002. Thus, the sample of fifth graders tested in 2001 with valid third grade scores contains fewer students who experienced retention problems in third or fourth grade than the comparable sample of fifth graders tested in 2002. By restricting the samples to students who last tested in third grade exactly two years prior, we are holding the progression patterns in the treatment and control samples constant.

A second alternative procedure involves conditioning on a different progression pattern by restricting the samples to students tested two years prior during their first year in third grade. These samples would only include students with “normal” grade progression. We conducted analyses on these samples and found results that are quite similar to those in Figures 2a and 2b

27,205 students with valid third grade scores took the ISAT in third grade for the final time in 1999. The comparable sample for 2000 contains 27,851 students. 20,060 of these 1999 third graders and 21,199 of these 2000 third graders appear in the ISAT fifth grade test files for 2001 and 2002 respectively. Thus, the sample retention rate is slightly higher in the 2000-2002 sample (73.7 percent vs. 76.1 percent). The main source of this difference in retention rates is that there are fewer student id number matches looking forward from the 1999 sample. This primarily reflects fewer exits from CPS for the 2000 sample as well as fewer student id numbers in the relevant ISAT files that are not coded correctly. For all our analyses of ITBS scores in the 1990s, our retention rates for both the pre-reform and post-reform cohorts are always between 80 and 82 percent. Because CPS administered these exams as part of their own accountability system, there were fewer problems with matching exams to correct student ID numbers. In the end, our ISAT analyses include 18,305 and 19,651 students from the 2001 and 2002 samples respectively who have valid scores on both exams and were tested without accommodations.

Panel A of Appendix Table 1 describes the data used to construct Figures 2a and 2b and also describes differences in baseline characteristics between the 2001 and 2002 samples. The predicted 5<sup>th</sup> grade scores for 2002 are based on the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade scores for the 2002 cohort and the estimated coefficients from regressions of 5<sup>th</sup> grade math and reading scores on polynomials in the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade math and reading scores for the 2001 cohort. Because the 2002 cohort has slightly lower overall 3<sup>rd</sup> grade scores, the average predicted scores in 2002 are below those for 2001 in math and reading. Panels B and C of Appendix Table 1 are similar descriptions of the data used to construct Figures 4a and 4b, and 5a and 5b, respectively. Although Panel A shows that students from the post-NCLB cohort are over-represented in the bottom deciles of the pre-reform cohort's achievement distribution, Panels B and C show that, with regard to the earlier district-level accountability plan, the post-reform cohorts are over-represented in the top deciles of the pre-reform achievement distribution. Here, the overall predicted average scores among the 1998 cohorts are slightly higher than the corresponding average scores among the pre-reform cohorts.

Having noted these differences in average predicted scores by cohort, we stress that, in all three panels, the average scores of the pre-reform cohorts and the average predicted scores for the post-reform cohorts match almost exactly within each decile. Further, as we note in the text, we have conducted our analyses including extra controls for gender, race, and eligibility for free lunch, and our results are almost identical. In the 1990s, our post reform cohorts are slightly more prepared on average than the pre-reform cohorts and the opposite is true in the NCLB years, but within our decile groups, all sixty comparisons between our treatment and control samples indicate that our treatment and control groups match well in terms of academic preparation during the pre-reform periods.

**Appendix Table 1: Treatment and Control Scores and Sample Sizes**

<b>Panel A: 2002 vs. 2001 Samples, 5th Grade ISAT</b>								
Decile	Sample Size		Average Math Score			Average Reading Score		
	2001	2002	2001 (Actual)	2002 (Actual)	2002 (Predicted)	2001 (Actual)	2002 (Actual)	2002 (Predicted)
3rd Grade Score Index (1999 Sample)								
1	1,833	2,447	140.8	140.3	140.8	139.6	139.7	139.9
2	1,845	2,540	144.7	144.4	144.6	144.0	144.1	144.0
3	1,825	2,287	147.0	148.1	146.9	146.4	147.1	146.5
4	1,825	1,783	149.7	151.1	149.5	149.1	150.3	149.2
5	1,826	1,745	152.6	153.4	152.5	151.6	152.6	151.8
6	1,828	1,691	154.9	156.9	154.8	154.0	155.5	154.1
7	1,838	1,718	158.6	160.1	158.5	157.1	158.7	157.4
8	1,825	1,736	162.3	163.9	162.0	160.6	162.1	161.0
9	1,840	1,810	168.0	168.9	167.7	165.3	166.1	165.5
10	1,820	1,894	178.7	179.5	178.7	174.2	174.4	174.4
Total	18,305	19,651	155.7	155.5	154.6	154.2	154.0	153.4

<b>Panel B: 1998 vs. 1996 Samples, 5th Grade ITBS</b>								
Decile	Sample Size		Average Math Score			Average Reading Score		
	1996	1998	1996 (Actual)	1998 (Actual)	1998 (Predicted)	1996 (Actual)	1998 (Actual)	1998 (Predicted)
3rd Grade Score Index (1994 Sample)								
1	2,193	1,964	3.71	3.69	3.71	3.53	3.41	3.52
2	2,211	1,892	4.09	4.17	4.11	3.87	3.91	3.87
3	2,167	1,895	4.38	4.49	4.40	4.13	4.20	4.14
4	2,162	1,917	4.68	4.82	4.70	4.50	4.59	4.49
5	2,177	2,035	4.95	5.09	4.97	4.78	4.90	4.79
6	2,206	2,064	5.22	5.33	5.23	5.13	5.19	5.11
7	2,176	2,220	5.55	5.62	5.57	5.43	5.53	5.42
8	2,181	2,264	5.82	5.94	5.86	5.82	5.84	5.77
9	2,172	2,180	6.23	6.32	6.25	6.31	6.35	6.29
10	2,176	2,313	6.92	6.96	6.97	7.38	7.34	7.42
Total	21,821	20,744	5.15	5.30	5.24	5.09	5.20	5.16

<b>Panel C: 1998 vs. 1996 Samples, 6th Grade ITBS</b>								
Decile	Sample Size		Average Math Score			Average Reading Score		
	1996	1998	1996 (Actual)	1998 (Actual)	1998 (Predicted)	1996 (Actual)	1998 (Actual)	1998 (Predicted)
4th Grade Score Index (1994 Sample)								
1	2,406	2,370	4.40	4.45	4.37	4.04	4.07	4.01
2	2,314	2,092	4.93	5.15	4.96	4.56	4.76	4.57
3	2,366	2,206	5.28	5.53	5.30	4.94	5.18	4.95
4	2,370	2,263	5.62	5.88	5.64	5.28	5.51	5.28
5	2,342	2,245	5.92	6.16	5.95	5.63	5.79	5.63
6	2,372	2,389	6.20	6.46	6.21	5.94	6.12	5.94
7	2,351	2,338	6.54	6.77	6.56	6.30	6.45	6.30
8	2,364	2,416	6.86	7.07	6.88	6.71	6.86	6.70
9	2,362	2,543	7.37	7.51	7.36	7.26	7.33	7.28
10	2,348	2,551	8.20	8.28	8.20	8.46	8.54	8.50
Total	23,595	23,413	6.13	6.37	6.19	5.91	6.12	5.97

## Appendix B: Educational Triage

Here, we show that if some students are receiving extra help, students that receive no extra help must be in the extremes of the ability distribution. Recall the notation from section 1. The school's problem is described in equation (1):

$$\min_{e_i} \Psi \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N F(\bar{t} - e_i - \alpha_i) \right] + \sum_{i=1}^N c e_i \quad s.t. \quad e_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$

Define  $e^*$  as the vector that solves (1) and consider any three elements of this vector  $(e_l^*, e_m^*, e_h^*)$  that are the optimal allocations for students with abilities  $\alpha_l < \alpha_m < \alpha_h$ .

**Proposition:**  $e_h^* > 0$ ,  $e_m^* = 0$ ,  $e_l^* > 0$  cannot be true simultaneously.

If  $e_h^* > 0$ ,  $e_m^* = 0$ ,  $e_l^* > 0$ , we must consider four cases, and in each case, there is an increment  $\delta$  that we use to define a new vector of effort allocations  $\hat{e}$  such that

$$\hat{e}_i = e_i^* \quad \forall i \neq l, m, h; \quad e_h^* + e_m^* + e_l^* = \hat{e}_h + \hat{e}_m + \hat{e}_l; \quad \hat{e}_h \geq 0, \hat{e}_m \geq 0, \hat{e}_l \geq 0;$$

$$\text{and} \quad \sum_{s \in \{l, m, h\}} F(\bar{t} - \hat{e}_s - \alpha_s) < \sum_{s \in \{l, m, h\}} F(\bar{t} - e_s^* - \alpha_s)$$

Because  $\hat{e}$  is feasible, creates the same total cost as  $e^*$ , and lowers expected failures,  $e^*$  cannot be the solution to our problem. The arguments in Cases 1 – 2b rely on  $f(\cdot)$  being unimodal. The argument in 2c also requires that  $f(\cdot)$  is symmetric.

$$\text{Case 1: } f(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) = f(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) < f(\bar{t} - \alpha_m)$$

$$\hat{e}_l = e_l^*, \hat{e}_m = \delta, \hat{e}_h = e_h^* - \delta$$

$$\text{Case 2a: } f(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) = f(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) \geq f(\bar{t} - \alpha_m), \text{ and } f'(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) < 0$$

$$\hat{e}_l = \alpha_m - \alpha_l - \delta, \hat{e}_m = e_l^* - (\alpha_m - \alpha_l), \hat{e}_h = e_h^* + \delta.$$

Note that  $f'(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) < 0$  implies that  $\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l \leq \bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h < \bar{t} - \alpha_m$ .

Thus,  $\hat{e}_m = e_l^* - (\alpha_m - \alpha_l) > 0$ .

Case 2b:  $f(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) = f(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) \geq f(\bar{t} - \alpha_m)$ , and  $f'(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) \geq 0, f'(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) < 0$   
 $\hat{e}_l = \alpha_m - \alpha_l - \delta, \hat{e}_m = e_l^* - (\alpha_m - \alpha_l) + \delta, \hat{e}_h = e_h^*$

Here,  $\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l \leq \bar{t} - \alpha_m$ , which implies  $\hat{e}_m > 0$

Case 2c:  $f(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) = f(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) \geq f(\bar{t} - \alpha_m)$ , and  $f'(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) \geq 0, f'(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) \geq 0$   
 $\hat{e}_l = \alpha_m - \alpha_l - \delta, \hat{e}_m = e_l^* - (\alpha_m - \alpha_l) + \frac{\delta}{2}, \hat{e}_h = e_h^* + \frac{\delta}{2}$

Because  $f(\cdot)$  is symmetric,  $\hat{e}$  lowers total failure probabilities relative to  $e^*$  even if

$$f(\bar{t} - e_h^* - \alpha_h) = f(\bar{t} - e_l^* - \alpha_l) = f(\bar{t} - \alpha_m)$$

