Primary Research Focuses: Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory

References: 

• Benjamin Brooks (Committee Chair)
• Philip J. Reny
• Doron Ravid

Job Market Paper: "Collusion-Robust Auction Design: Posted Price and a Knockout Auction"

[Abstract] I study how a revenue-maximizing principal allocating a single good should optimally design her auction in the presence of collusion. The principal evaluates mechanisms according to the worst-case revenue that could arise from collusive or non-collusive play. The principal’s optimal mechanism is to post a price and run an efficient knockout auction in-house. Posting a price and running the efficient knockout in-house remains the optimal mechanism when the principal additionally hypothesizes that colluders are maximizing their joint surplus or are constrained by interim truth-telling constraints. With surplus-maximizing colluders, posting a price without running the knockout in-house is also an optimal mechanism.